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I.

Introduction

After penalties and goals, red cards are the next most significant event that can impact the
outcome of a soccer (football) game.1 They are both dramatic and potentially game
changing and they aren't quite as rare as we may imagine.2 While everyone understands
the circumstantial effect of red cards – the immediate loss of a player – statistical analysis
helps us better understand the extent to which teams are impacted when they receive a red
card. This is more so as it remains unclear whether a sending-off of a player actually turns
out to be a punishment for the penalized team, or if - as a popular soccer myth states –
penalized teams perform better than they would have performed, had they not received a
red card.3
There are many instances where a red card can change the momentum of a game. 4 How a
team reacts to getting a red card can influence the final score in the game.5 This paper will
While soccer is the popular name of the game in North America, it is known as football in the rest
of the world. In this paper, the two terms will be used interchangeably.
1

On average, around 15% of matches in the English Premier League in a given year feature one or
more red cards, so statistically speaking we are more likely to see a red card than a 1-1 draw.
2

3

In this paper, we use red card and sending-off interchangeably.

A perfect example of how a red card affects the game can be seen when analyzing a recent
Champions League second-leg game between Manchester United and Real Madrid. Manchester
United were controlling the game – United nullified Madrid’s potent attack by using Danny Welbeck
to restrict Madrid’s most creative player Xabi Alonso – after Sergio Ramos had scored an own goal
to give the Manchester United a 2-1 lead. However, the game turned when United winger Nani was
sent off for a dangerous challenge at 56 minutes. Not only did United have a man less, they also had
to move Welbeck to left midfield, in order to preserve their mid-field – allowing Alonso to roam free
and become more creative. Known for reacting to situations quickly, it took Madrid’s manager Jose
Mourinho just four minutes to make a substitution – replacing Alvaro Arbeloa with Luka Modric,
and swapping Sami Khedira to right back. The change turned the game as Modric controlled the
center of midfield with intricate passing sequences, and scored the equalizer with a long-range
strike. After equalizing, Real Madrid continued with their attack, scoring their second goal within 13
minutes of Nani’s red card.
4

Over the 60 English Premier League games where a team saw a red card in 2012-13 season, 20%
dropped points at the final whistle when compared to their predicted points (based on the score
prior to sending off). For the 20 teams that were drawing at the time of receiving a red card in
2012-13 Premier League, 65 percent went on to lose, 30 percent held on for a draw and just 5
1
5

attempt to estimate the impact of a red card on both the home team and the visiting team
using an extensive data set from the English Premier League for the seasons 1992-93 to
2012-13. The results show that a team with a red card suffers by scoring less goals than
they would have done had they kept a full complement of players on the pitch and they also
concede more goals than would have otherwise. In other words, we do not find support for
the myth that ‘ten is better than eleven’ in a soccer game.
There have been some attempts in the literature to estimate the effects of red cards in
soccer. Using data from the Dutch professional soccer league from 1989 to 1992, Ridder et
al (1994) find that red cards have a negative impact on team performance. Carmichael and
Thomas (2005) also analyze the effects of sending-offs using data from the 1997-98 season
of the English Premier League and find that the expulsion of a player is less costly to
visiting teams than to home teams. They argue that visiting teams, who - in many cases play more defensively, are better able to accommodate to the disadvantage of having one
less player. Caliendo and Radic (2006) focus on FIFA World Cup matches from 1930 to
2002. Their results show no support for the ‘‘ten do it better’’ myth. However, they show
that if a sending-off takes place in the second half of the match, the ten players do not at
least perform worse.
Using a data set containing German Bundesliga matches with at least one red card between
1963 and 2004, Bar-Eli et al (2006) show that an expulsion weakens the team and that its
scoring and winning chances decrease. They also find that home teams are more likely to
score the first goal after a sending-off. As a number of studies including Carmichael and
Thomas (2005) suggest, home teams are in general more likely to win matches. Therefore,
the findings of Bar-Eli et al. (2006) do not necessarily indicate an effect of red cards as
matches without a sending-off should also be taken into account to control for selection
percent – one team – managed to win. Unsurprisingly, the team that had a player sent off gained
fewer points per game. During the 2012-13 season, the average time for each dismissal was 56
minutes and the average number of goals scored after the dismissal was 1.15 with the team down
to 10 men averaging 0.38 goals and the team with 11 men averaging 0.77 goals. The team with the
red card contributed 33 percent of the goals.
2

bias. Using data from the Bundesliga, Anders and Rotthoff (2011) analyze the effects of
yellow and red cards on the probability of victory for a team and find that the probability of
a win decreases for the team that receives a yellow or red card.
Mechtel et al (2011) use data from the German Bundesliga for the seasons 1999-2000 to
2008-09 to show that the key factors explaining the status of a match following a sendingoff are the strength of each team, the remaining time to go, the home team’s specific home
advantage, and whether the penalized team is playing a home game. A sending-off always
has a negative impact on a home team’s performance, whereas the effects of a sending-off
against a guest team crucially depend on the time left in the match. Titman et al. (2012)
show that teams playing against a red-carded rival benefited by a 64.5 percent scoring rate
increase. Previous research looking at a number of English Premier League seasons also
indicates that the longer teams have a player deficit, the worse off they will be.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the theoretical underpinnings of the
paper while Section III presents the data and the model. The estimation results are
discussed in Section IV. The paper ends with concluding remarks in Section V.
II.

Theoretical Underpinnings

A red card is shown by a referee to signify that a player has been sent off.7 A player who has
been sent off is required to leave the field of play immediately and must take no further

If a team receives a red card in the first minute, their average goal difference in the game would be
reduced by about 1.5 goals. This is reduced to 0.85 and 0.62 if a team is affected by a red card at
half-time and 60 minutes, respectively.
6

It was not until 1982 that the use of red card became compulsory in every football game. During
the 1966 World Cup quarter-finals between Argentina and England, English referee Ken Aston
observed that, due to the absence of a common language, German referee Rudolf Keitlin had a hard
time telling Argentine striker Antonio Rattin that he wants the player out of the game. Aston
thought that there must be a refereeing signal that is clear and understandable to all and later came
up with the use of yellow and red card based on traffic light colors. After a trial in the Olympic
soccer games of 1968, the yellow and red cards were first used in the 1970 FIFA World Cup
tournament.
3
7

part in the game. Contrary to, for example, hockey or handball, the player who has been
sent off cannot be replaced during the game; his team must continue the game with one
less player.8 A red card will be shown to a player who has committed a serious offence such
as violent conduct or an illegal and purposeful obstruction of a goal scoring opportunity for
the opposing team. It is also shown to a player who accumulates two yellow cards for more
minor offenses.9
This paper will follow the theoretical underpinnings of a red card as developed in Mechtel
et al (2011). A team in a soccer game consists of different team members having to
cooperate to achieve their common target - to score goals and to win a match. Following
Belbin (2004), it can be argued that in a soccer team, each player has a specific functional
role, for example, goalkeepers, defenders, midfielders, or strikers. The team manager or
coach forms the team with the optimal combination of players and functional roles at the
beginning of the match and constantly optimizes the team’s composition regarding players’
abilities and roles. Consequently, a sending-off will lead to a suboptimal composition of the
team (Belbin, 2004), which in turn will result in a lower ability to perform (Ancona &
Caldwell, 1992; Lazear, 1999). The remaining ten players have to cope with the situation by

Only players, substitutes and substituted players may receive a red card. If a goalkeeper receives a
red card another player will be allowed to assume goalkeeping duties (teams will usually substitute
an outfield player for another goalkeeper if this option is available).
8

Law 12 of the Laws of the Game lists the categories of misconduct for which a player may be sent
off. These are: serious foul play (a violent foul); violent conduct (any other act of violence) e.g.
assaulting the referee; Spitting at anyone or another player; a deliberate handling offense to deny
an obvious goal-scoring opportunity by any player other than a goalkeeper in his own penalty area;
committing an offence that denies an opponent an obvious goal-scoring opportunity (informally
known as a professional foul); using offensive, insulting or abusive language or gestures; and
receiving a second caution (yellow card) in the same game. In most tournaments, a single direct red
card (i.e. not one received as a result of two successive yellow ones) results in disqualification of the
offending player for one or more of subsequent matches, the exact number of matches varying by
the offence committed and by jurisdiction. Should a team's on-field players receive a total of five
red cards, they will be unable to field the required minimum of seven players and the match will be
abandoned.
9
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compensating for the missing player. Mechtel et al (2011) argues that at least some players
have to fulfill not only their own functional role but also parts of the role of the penalized
player. Given this reasoning, the role effect on the performance of the penalized team
should be negative. Thus, Mechtel et al (2011) pose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 ‘‘role effect’’: A sending-off affects the performance of the penalized team
negatively.
However, we cannot ignore the motivational aspects of a sending-off. Latane´ (1973) in his
theory of social impact suggests that group size is negatively correlated with the outside
pressure felt by group members. The smaller a group becomes, the more the perceived
pressure increases. As sending-off reduces the size of the penalized team, the social impact
theory can be used to suggest that the sending-off increases the perceived pressure on the
remaining players, inducing higher effort levels. As performance should be positively
affected by player effort, we expect a positive motivation effect on the performance of the
reduced team. Thus, we can make a case for the common myth that ten players perform
better than eleven. This leads to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 ‘‘motivation effect’’: A sending-off affects the performance of the penalized team
positively.
In soccer, the two competing teams can be classified as either the home or the visiting
team. Empirically, the tasks of the home and the visiting teams are different, though of
course both teams have to concur with the rules of soccer and share the objective of
winning the match. Home teams usually choose a more offensive strategy than visiting
teams (Carmichael and Thomas, 2005). The visiting teams’ defensive strategy might be
conceived as less complex than the home teams’ offensive strategy because the latter
represents a constant struggle for a balance between scoring and not letting the other team
counterattack.

5

Given this reasoning, Mechtel et al (2011) argue that the home team faces a more complex
task. Task complexity influences how fast a penalized team can adapt to the change in
functional roles. The higher the task complexity, the more difficult is the adjustment of the
play to a sending-off. Assuming that the home team has to perform the more complex task,
the performance of a penalized home team will suffer more from a sending-off than that of
a penalized visiting team. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 ‘‘task effect’’: A sending-off has larger negative effects on the performance of the
penalized team whenever it is the home team.

III.

Data and Model

The paper tests for the three hypotheses proposed in Mechtel et al (2011), and discussed in
the previous Section, using data from the English Premier League for the seasons 1992-93
to 2012-13.10 Data are downloaded from

http://soccernet-akamai.espn.go.com and

http://www.myfootballfacts.com/. At the top of the English football (soccer) league
system, the Premier League is the country's primary soccer competition.11 It was formed on
20 February 1992 following the decision of soccer clubs to break away from The Football
League, which was originally founded in 1888, and take advantage of a lucrative television
rights deal. The league held its first season in 1992–93 participated by 22 clubs.12
It is currently sponsored by Barclays Bank and thus officially known as the Barclays Premier
League.
10

The Premier League is the most-watched football league in the world, broadcast in 212 territories
to 643 million homes and a potential TV audience of 4.7 billion people. In the 2010–11 season the
average Premier League match attendance was 35,363, the second highest of any professional
football league behind the German Bundesliga, and stadium occupancy was 92.2% capacity. Over 13
million spectators attended Premier League games during the 2012-13 season.
11

12

The 22 inaugural members of the new Premier League were Arsenal, Aston Villa, Blackburn Rovers,
Chelsea, Coventry City, Crystal Palace, Everton, Ipswich Town, Leeds United, Liverpool, Manchester City,
Manchester United, Middlesbrough, Norwich City, Nottingham Forest, Oldham Athletic, Queens Park
Rangers, Sheffield United, Sheffield Wednesday, Southampton, Tottenham Hotspur, and Wimbledon.
6

Currently, contested by 20 clubs, it operates on a system of promotion and relegation.
Seasons run from August to May, with each team playing the others twice (a double roundrobin system), once at their home stadium and once at that of their opponents, for a total of
38 games each, totaling 380 matches in the season.13
Teams receive three points for a win and one point for a draw. No points are awarded for a
loss. Teams are ranked by total points, then goal difference, and then goals scored. At the
end of each season, the club with the most points is crowned champion. If points are equal,
the goal difference and then goals scored determine the winner. If still equal, teams are
deemed to occupy the same position. If there is a tie for the championship, for relegation, or
for qualification to other competitions, a play-off match at a neutral venue decides rank.
The three lowest placed teams are relegated into the Football League Championship,
and the top two teams from the Championship, together with the winner of play-offs
involving the third to sixth placed Championship clubs, are promoted in their place.14 Table
A1 in the Appendix provides a detail list of performance by various teams in the English
Premier League during the 1992-93 to 2012-13 sample period.
Table 1 provides a detail list of red and yellow cards given in the English Premier League
during the 1992-93 to 2012-13 seasons. The number of red cards varied from a low of 33 in
the 1993-94 season to 75 in the 2005-6 season. The average number of red cards given in
any season is …. Table 2 provides a team wise breakdown of red and yellow cards. Among
reams that played in the Premier League during the entire 21 years sample period, Everton
got the highest number of red cards (74) followed by Arsenal (69). Among all teams,
Blackburn Rovers got the highest number of red cards (75) although they played only 18
seasons.

13

Each team played forty-two games per season during 1992-93 to 1994-95.

Of the 46 clubs to have competed since the inception of the Premier League in 1992, five have
won the title: Manchester United (13), Arsenal (3), Chelsea (3), Blackburn Rovers (1) and
Manchester City (1).
14
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The increasing popularity of soccer modelling and prediction in recent years is mainly due
to two reasons (Karlis and Ntzoufras, 2009). First, the soccer market has expanded
considerably in the past years; modern soccer teams are profitable companies usually with
large investments and budgets, and a large base of fans. Second, the amount spent on
bettings has increased dramatically, especially in Europe. As a result, the demand for
models which provide good predictions for the outcome of a soccer match has increased.
In the literature on modeling soccer match outcomes, two measures of team performance
are usually proposed. The goals-based approach analyses the number of goals scored and
conceded by each team, whereas the result-based approach usually uses the categories of
win, draw, and loss to model a match’s outcome. Within the first approach, the Poisson
distribution has been found to be appropriate for describing the number of goals scored by
two competing teams (see, e.g., Dixon & Coles, 1997; Lee, 1997; Maher, 1982; Rue &
Salvesen, 2000).
In the second approach, the match’s result is modeled in terms of win, draw, or loss. Here,
the outcome of a match is a discrete variable with a natural ordering that can only take on
three values. Ordered logit or ordered probit models are typically used (see, e.g., Audas,
Dobson, & Goddard, 2002; Bar-Eli et al., 2006; Goddard & Asimakopoulos, 2004; Koning,
2000; Kuypers, 2000).
Goddard (2005) provides an empirical comparison between the goals-based approach and
the result-based approach and finds the differences between the results of the two
approaches to be rather small. For our analysis, we consider whether the outcome is a win,
draw, or loss from a home team’s perspective. Here an ordered logit or probit estimation is
the preferred estimation strategy due to the few-values-taking natural ordering of
alternatives (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). This discrete structure of the dependent variable
could render Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, as the standard method for
estimations with a metric dependent variable, inappropriate.

8

Given the discrete, ordinal nature of the dependent variable, we use the ordered logit
method for our estimation (see Greene, 2011 for details).15 We implicitly model factors
influencing the outcome of a match by defining a latent variable y*, say an unobserved
measure of team strength, which crosses progressively higher thresholds αi. For each
match i, we specify
y*i = x’iβ + ɛi
where β and xi represent the respective vectors of coefficients and regressors (without an
intercept), and ɛi the error term. For very low y*, the outcome variable takes the lowest
observable value, whereas whenever y* crosses an αi the outcome variable increases by
+1. Given our data, we have m = 3 (win–draw–lose), where we define
yi = j

if αj-1< y*i<αj, j = 1…m,
where α0 = 0 and αm = +2, respectively.

We maximize the log likelihood of
Pr[yi = j] = F(αj - xJiβ) – F(αj-1 – xJiβ)
where F is the cumulative distribution function of ɛi. The sign of the regression parameters,
β can be immediately interpreted as determining whether the latent variable, y*, increases
with the regressor.
IV.

Empirical Results

The basic model takes the following form:
Outcomeis = β1SOHomeis + β2SOVisitoris + ɛis
where Outcomeis is defined in terms of win, draw, and loss from the home team’s
perspective for match i in season s. SOHomeis and SOVisitoris are dummy variables taking
the value of 1 if a player of the home team, or respectively, the visiting team, is sent-off
during the game (and 0 otherwise).

Estimation using ordered probit produces similar results. The degree of excess of our dependent
variable … is 22.8/1.482 – 3 = 7.4, suggesting that the use of the (leptokurtic) logistic distribution is
more appropriate.
9
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The results for the basic model are given in Columns 1 in Table 3. The coefficients for both
dummy variables are statistically significant. We find that a red card against the home team
is correlated with a worse match outcome from the home team’s perspective. Similarly, a
red card against the visiting team is also correlated with a worse result from the visiting
team’s point of view, as the dependent variable is defined from the home teams’
perspective.
Next, we introduce and include various control variables in the basic model. An important
factor affecting a soccer match’s result is the strength of each team. We incorporate control
variables for each team’s strength and interpret team strength not as the performance of
the team on the day but as the overall strength during the season s. However, the problem
with this measure is that the outcome of each match we analyze influences this measure.
To avoid this endogeneity problem, we take the average of a team’s total points in the final
table earned in season s and s-1. Column 2 in Table 3 show the ordered logit regression
results when augmenting our basic model with team strength variables (Strength home
(points) and Strength visitor (points)). With respect to the impact of team strength, we find
that stronger teams perform better. However, we do not find substantial changes in the
correlation between a sending-off and a match’s outcome in comparison to our basic
model. The effects are still significant at the 1% level for both teams.
One particularly important factor in soccer is the existence of a home advantage.16 As the
supporters want to help their team and intimidate the opponent team, it would be useful to

Studies highlight that the probability of receiving a red card is different between home and
visiting teams. Data collected from the Champions League during 2002-2007 show that in only 24.3
percent of games did the home team incur more yellow cards than the visiting team. During that
period home teams received a red card in 6.42 percent of games, while the visiting teams received
them in 11.82 percent of games. This means that visiting teams picked up red cards 84 percent
more often than home sides. Interestingly, in 82.89 percent of games there were no red cards.
16

Research on the Bundesliga (Anders & Rotthoff, 2010) from 2004 to 2009 highlight that the effect
of cards on the home team is different to that of the visiting side. Titman et al. (2012) find that a
home red card increases a visiting teams’ scoring rate by 60 percent and decreases the home sides’
10

test whether there is a ‘‘supporters effect’’ on the outcome of a match. One way to measure
this is to include total number of attendance in a game. It can be safely assumed that the
majority of these attendees are supporter of the home team. The result in Column 3 shows
that attendance does have a statistically significant impact on the final outcome of a match.
The larger the number of attendees in a soccer game (assuming majority of them are
supporters of the home team), the better their result in the particular match. In other
words, the enthusiasm of the home team supporters help to motivate the home team. This
is unlike the results reported in Mechtel et al (2011) who found attendance to have no
impact on the performance of the home team.
Caliendo and Radic (2006) examine another important factor for the effect of a sending-off:
the time to go until the end of the match. To control for this time aspect, we implement two
additional variables, where we interact the sending-off dummy variables with the
remaining time in the match when the sending-off occurs (SOHome *Min to go and
SOVisitor *Min to go). The results in Column 4 in Table 3 show that both these variables are
statistically insignificant. Taken together, the results imply that it doesn’t matter when a
team gets the red card, it will make the penalized team worse off. The results are robust
irrespective of whether the penalized team is the home or visiting team.
Another important control variable is the score at the minute of occurrence (standing).
However, including the standing by itself as a control variable implicitly imposes the notion
that the standing would have the same impact on the match’s outcome in different minutes
in the match. Clearly, this is not the case. A 2-0 in the 75th minute has a larger impact on
the result than a 2-0 in the 35th minute. In order to take this into account, we use six
dummy variables sixth for each sixth (minute 1-15, 16-30, 31-45, 46-60, 61-75, and 76-90)
of a match taking the value of 1 whenever there has been a sending-off in this sixth (and 0
scoring rate by 17 percent. In comparison, a red card for the visiting team sees the home team’s
chances of scoring increase by 69 percent and the visiting team’s chances decrease by a massive 42
percent, which shows the handicap for visiting teams is more severe.
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otherwise). We interact each of these dummy variables with SOStanding– the standing in
terms of win–draw–loss. This results in six interaction terms that are 0 in sixths without a
sending-off and take the value of the standing in sixths with a sending-off. By including
these SOStanding * sixth interaction terms in our empirical model, we control for the score
before the sending-off and, thereby, switch off a possible reverse causality effect.
The results can be seen in columns 4 and 5 in Table 3. The coefficient of the dummy
variable for a home team sending-off remains negative and significant at the 1% level. The
guest team dummy variable is positive and statistically significant. From the home team’s
perspective this indicates that a red card against the guest team leads to a score that is
better for the home team. So the team that is penalized by a red card ends up worse off
irrespective of whether it is the home or the guest team. Additionally, many of the six
control variables taking into account the score at the minute of the sending-off are
significant and have the expected signs: the standing in the match is positively correlated
with the final score or result.
In columns 5 of Table 3 we also include control variables for information on each team’s
performance during the match. In the literature, a number of such performance indicators
have been used, such as, the number of goal attempts, corners, and yellow cards per team.
As we use the team strength variables to control for strength within the season, one might
argue that we should also control for each team’s strength within the particular game. We
use the number of corners taken by each team to measure team performance. Both turn
out to be highly significant and to have the expected sign. The team who can force more
corner kicks appear to perform better in that particular game.17
Ordered logit model uses a maximum likelihood method to accurately estimate the
empirical model (Greene, 2011). Consequently, R-square cannot be used to measure the

We also include the number of yellow cards that a team receives in the game. But the variable
turns out to be insignificant from both the home and visiting team’s perspective.
17
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significance of the model fit. Instead, chi-square is utilized. The results in Table 3 show that
in terms of explanatory power all the models are statistically satisfactory. The significant
LR values indicate that the explanatory variables used in each model are all jointly
significant.
The coefficient estimates in Table 3 do not give the marginal effects of the right hand side
variables on the probabilities of win, draw or loss. To interpret the magnitude of the
regression parameters, we use the procedure described in Greene (2011) to calculate the
marginal effects.18 The results are presented in Table 4. The marginal effects of dummy
variables (such as SOHomeis) are calculated as the discrete change in y as the dummy
variable changes from 0 to 1, while other covariates are evaluated at their mean. We find
that a sending-off against the home team (SOHome) leads to a .0415 lower probability for
the home team to win the match. A sending-off against the visiting team increases the
probability for the home team to win by .0583. In addition, a sending-off against the home
team makes a draw or a defeat of the home team more likely.

V.

Further Analysis

Another variable of interest is the yellow card. As yellow cards increase during a game, the
in-play probability of a player being dismissed grows. Titman et al. (2012) stated a yellow
card to any player on a team in the Premier League more than doubles the hazard of a
straight red card to any other player on that team. Interestingly, Titman et al (2012) also
discovered that a team’s booking rate increases by 25% if the opposing team receives a
yellow card, which reinforces the notion that referees have a tendency to ‘even up’
decisions during the game. However, in our estimation, the yellow card variable is
insignificant in all cases.

The marginal effect shows the probability to choosing alternative j when regressor xr changes.
See Greene (2011) for a description of how the marginal effects are calculated.
13
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Recent statistics has shown that in the English Premier League, approximately 45% of goals
come before the interval and 55% afterwards. In fact if we plot the number of goals scored
in various 10 minute segments over the course of a contest we will find that the later
segments see more goals than the earlier ones. In short, the rate of goal scoring increases
with time. Statistics also shows that over the last 6 seasons one average dismissal occurred
just after the 60th minute and the average change in goal difference amounted to 0.61 of a
goal. About 64% of the 0.61 difference occurred because the side with 11 players scored
more than they would have expected to score prior to the card and the rest came about by
the infringing side scoring less.
An analysis of the 2011-12 Premier League season shows that there were over 60 matches
featuring a red card and the overall share of the league points for the carded side fell from
nearly 40% just prior to the card to only 20% at the final whistle. Blackburn turned a 2-1
deficit against Wigan into a 3-3 despite being reduced to ten men after 48 minutes, but this
was a rarity overall. A much more typical outcome concerns the fate of the 20 sides which
were drawing when one of their players was red carded. 13 went onto lose, six hung on for
a draw and one (Blackburn again) managed a win.
So the general case firmly belies the often repeated footballing cliché that playing against
ten men is more difficult than when a team faces eleven opponents. It may require a
different tactical approach, but the final result is more often a favorable one.
Using data from multiple Premiership seasons and extrapolating across the ninety minutes
of a game indicates that a team which receives a red card in the first minute should expect
to see their average goal difference in such matches reduced by about 1.5 goals, both
through lack of firepower and an increased tendency to concede. If the card is delayed until
half time, the cost to the recipient is 0.85 of a goal and by an hour in it has further fallen to
0.62 of a goal.
So how do the three hypotheses developed at the beginning of the paper play out in the
English Premier League? First, we find support for the ‘role effect’ hypothesis, that is, the
14

sending-offs negatively affect the performance of the penalized team. For both the
penalized home and visiting teams, we find a highly significant negative effect of a red card,
no matter when the sending-off occurs. Assuming that the team is composed optimally at
the beginning of the match, a sending-off weakens the team, as a player specialized in a
certain position is excluded from the match.
Second, we do not find any support for the ‘motivation effect’. Getting a red card didn’t
increase the perceived pressure on the remaining players inducing higher effort levels. This
is true for both the home and the visiting teams. Thus we do not find any support for the
soccer myth that ‘ten do it better’.
VI.

Conclusion

An analysis of the data on red cards shown in the English Premier League during the 199192 to 2012-2013 seasons contradict the repeated soccer cliché that playing against ten men
is more difficult than eleven. As with goals, red cards are rare, but potent occurrences.
Occasionally, a depleted team will produce a seemingly improved performance by grabbing
a draw or an unexpected win, but in the long run a red card reduces the expected number
of points a team would have hoped to gain had they kept eleven men on the pitch. Teams
receiving a red card suffer both through scoring less goals than expected after the card and
conceding more.
The real significance of the red card is that, whereas goals are real and show up on the
scoreboard, a red card merely presents an opportunity and a challenge to the respective
teams. Over many repetitions a team will benefit from facing a diminished opponent, but
over a limited trial of a single match there still exists both the need to exploit their
advantage and the small possibility that long term expectation will succumb to short term
variation.
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Table 1: Statistics on Red and Yellow Cards and Premier League Champions and Runners-Up

Season

Red Cards

Yellow Cards

Champion

Runners-Up

2012-13

52

1178

Manchester United

Manchester City

2011-12

66

1154

Manchester City

Manchester United

2010-11

64

1237

Manchester City

Chelsea

2009-10

68

1235

Chelsea

Manchester United

2008-09

63

1192

Manchester United

Liverpool

2007-08

61

1210

Manchester United

Chelsea

2006-07

53

1222

Manchester United

Chelsea

2005-06

75

1171

Chelsea

Manchester United

2004-05

60

1031

Chelsea

Arsenal

2003-04

56

1133

Arsenal

Chelsea

2002-03

71

1155

Manchester United

Arsenal

2001-02

66

1090

Arsenal

Liverpool

2000-01

64

1208

Manchester United

Arsenal

1999-2000

68

1300

Manchester United

Arsenal

1998-99

73

1416

Manchester United

Arsenal

1997-98

69

1264

Arsenal

Manchester United

1996-97

43

1184

Manchester United

Newcastle United

1995-96

59

383

Manchester United

NewCastle United

1994-95

71

1308

Blackburn Rovers

Blackburn Rovers

1993-94

33

661

Manchester United

Blackburn Rovers

1992-93

35

795

Manchester United

Ashton Villa
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Table 2: Team-wise Breakdown of Red and Yellow Cards

Team

Red Cards

Yellow Cards

No. of years in
Premier League during sample period

Arsenal*

69

1151

21

Ashton Villa*

47

1122

21

Barnslay

5

65

1

Birmingham City

26

431

7

Blackburn Rovers

75

1090

18

2

47

1

43

815

13

Bradford City

2

98

2

Burnley

2

57

1

Charlton Athletic

21

404

8

Chelsea*

64

1237

21

Coventry City

23

441

9

Crystal Palace

10

208

4

Derby County

16

522

7

Everton*

74

1180

21

Fulham

34

646

12

Hull City

9

136

2

Ipswich Town

6

183

5

Leeds United

27

737

12

Leicester City

28

454

8

Liverpool*

47

977

21

Manchester City

56

863

16

Manchester United*

52

1045

21

Middlesbrough

44

858

14

Newcastle United

62

1028

18

Norwich City

11

268

6

Nottingham Forest

9

247

5

Blackpool
Bolton Wanderers

19

Table 2: Team-wise Breakdown of Red and Yellow Cards (Continued)

Team

Red Cards

Yellow Cards

No. of years in
Premier League during sample period

Oldham Athletic

4

69

2

Portsmouth

20

404

7

Queens Park Rangers

23

273

6

9

145

3

Sheffield United

10

164

3

Sheffield Wednesday

20

326

8

Southampton

37

721

14

Stoke City

18

347

5

Sunderland

47

805

12

Swansea City

4

98

2

Swindon Town

2

38

1

Tottenham Hotspur*

54

1105

21

Watford

6

116

2

West Bromwich Albion

24

371

7

West Ham United

60

1080

17

Wigan Athletic

28

515

8

Wimbledon

28

380

8

Wolverhampton Wanderers

12

260

4

Reading

---------------------------------Teams with * = ever present in Premier League
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Table 3: Ordered Logit Regression Results
Variables

__(1)___

__(2)___

__(3)___

__(4)___

__(5)___

SOHome

-0.465
(3.88)
0.332
(2.90)

-0.428
(3.70)
0.311
(2.45)
0.236
(4.18)
-0.280
(5.38)

-0.390
(3.66)
0.245
(2.32)
0.377
(5.10)
-0.144
(3.84)
0.640
(7.45)

-0.358
(2.69)
0.370
(3.94)
0.568
(6.22)
-0.285
(5.83)
0.857
(8.04)
0.078
(1.32)
0.056
(1.18)
-0.344
(1.60)
-0.425
(1.56)
-0.740
(1.58)
0.644
(2.96)
0.768
(3.65)
1.005
(5.15)

-0.490
(3.96)
(0.412)
(4.36)
0.373
(5.19)
-0.243
(5.13)
0.758
(6.85)
0.066
(1.64)
0.037
(0.79)
-0.327
(1.77)
-0.419
(1.77)
-0.566
(1.68)
0.380
(3.46)
0.664
(4.80)
0.988
(6.12)
0.866
(4.12)
-0.530
(5.99)

-3664.8
0.27
40.66
(13)

-4327.4
0.28
43.95
(15)

SOVisitor
Strength Home
Strength Visitor
Attendance
SOHome * Min to go
SOVisitor * Min to go
SOStanding * 1st Sixth
SOStanding * 2nd Sixth
SOStanding * 3rd Sixth
SOStanding * 4th Sixth
SOStanding * 5th Sixth
SOStanding * 6th Sixth
Home corner attempts
Visitor corner attempts

Log likelihood
-2065.2
2
Pseudo R
0.21
Chi-square for covariates 17.34
(degrees of freedom)
(2)

-2610.4
0.22
20.11
(4)

-3145.4
0.25
22.98
(5)

(t--statistics in parentheses)
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Table 4: Marginal Effect of Ordered Logit Regression

Variables

Home Victory

Draw

Away Victory

SOHome

-0.0415 (6.10)

0.0212 (4.15)

0.0393 (5.40)

SOVisitor

-0.0583 (3.44)

0.0862 (5.88)

0.0418 (6.18)

Strength Home

0.0166 (8.15)

-0.0365 (3.87)

-0.0403 (5.11)

Strength Visitor

-0.0112 (6.38)

0.0562 (4.10)

0.0982 (4.33)

Attendance

-0.0254 (3.90)

-0.0201 (3.18)

-0.0636 (5.10)

SOHome * Min to go

0.0241 (4.65)

0.0434 (4.18)

0.0592 (3.10)

SOVisitor * Min to go

-0.0908 (5.40)

-0.0668 (5.11)

-0.0702 (8.19)

SOStanding * 1st Sixth

0.0854 (1.13)

0.0406 (1.33)

0.0085 (1.00)

SOStanding * 2nd Sixth

0.0095 (1.04)

0.0285 (1.56)

0.0073 (0.92)

SOStanding * 3rd Sixth

0.0132 (1.19)

0.0313 (1.18)

0.0065 (1.03)

SOStanding * 4th Sixth

0.0361 (3.94)

0.0358 (3.34)

0.0292 (1.80)

SOStanding * 5th Sixth

0.0523 (5.05)

0.0498 (3.99)

0.0380 (1.98)

SOStanding * 6th Sixth

0.0966 (6.20)

0.0965 (4.73)

0.0514 (2.95)

Home corner attempts

0.0244 (3.62)

0.0155 (3.15)

0.0136 (2.80)

Visitor corner attempts

-0.0036 (2.14)

-0.0084 (2.62)

-0.0040 (3.10)
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Appendix Table A1: Premier League Club Statistics 1992-93 to 2012-13.

Pos.
Club
Seasons Pld W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Manchester United
21 810 528 168 114 1627 703 924 1752
2 Arsenal
21 810 436 214 160 1417 754 663 1522
3 Chelsea
21 810 423 208 179 1357 780 577 1477
4 Liverpool
21 810 396 207 207 1307 796 511 1395
5 Tottenham Hotspur
21 810 315 213 282 1138 1066 72 1158
6 Aston Villa
21 810 292 248 270 1020 992 28 1124
7 Everton
21 810 288 233 289 1029 1019 10 1097
8 Newcastle United
19 730 288 194 248 1041 953 88 1058
9 Blackburn Rovers
18 696 262 184 250 927 907 20 970
10 Manchester City
16 620 234 160 226 837 769 67 862
11 West Ham United
17 654 214 168 272 768 933 −165 810
12 Leeds United
12 468 189 125 154 641 573 68 692
13 Middlesbrough
14 536 160 156 220 621 741 −120 633[7]
14 Southampton
14 544 159 151 234 647 798 −151 628
15 Bolton Wanderers
13 494 149 128 217 575 745 −170 575
16 Fulham
12 456 141 131 187 530 612 −82 554
17 Sunderland
12 456 121 116 219 463 660 −197 479
18 Coventry City
9
354 99 112 143 387 490 −103 409
19 Sheffield Wednesday
8
316 101 89 126 409 453 −44 392
20 Wimbledon
8
316 99 94 123 384 472 −88 391
21 Charlton Athletic
8
304 93 82 129 342 442 −100 361
22 Leicester City
8
308 84 90 134 354 456 −102 342
23 Wigan Athletic
8
304 85 76 143 316 482 −166 331
24 Birmingham City
7
266 73 82 111 273 360 −87 301
25 Portsmouth
7
266 79 65 122 292 380 −88 293[8]
26 Norwich City
6
240 72 76 92 298 381 −83 292
27 Queens Park Rangers
6
240 73 59 108 297 358 −61 278
28 Derby County
7
266 68 70 128 271 420 −149 274
29 West Bromwich Albion
7
266 66 67 133 286 431 −145 265
30 Nottingham Forest
5
198 60 59 79 229 287 −58 239
31 Stoke City
5
190 56 57 77 188 249 −61 225
32 Ipswich Town
5
202 57 53 92 219 312 −93 224
33 Crystal Palace
4
160 37 49 74 160 243 −83 160
34 Wolverhampton Wanderers
4
152 32 40 80 156 281 −125 136
23

Pos.
Club
35 Sheffield United
36 Reading
37 Swansea City
38 Oldham Athletic
39 Hull City
40 Bradford City
41 Watford
42 Blackpool
43 Barnsley
44 Burnley
45 Swindon Town
46 Cardiff City

Seasons Pld
3
122
3
114
2
76
2
84
2
76
2
76
2
76
1
38
1
38
1
38
1
42
0
27

W
32
32
23
22
14
14
11
10
10
8
5
5

D
36
23
24
23
23
20
19
9
5
6
15
7

L
54
59
29
39
39
42
46
19
23
24
22
15

Source: http://www.soccerstats.com/latest.asp?league=england
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GF
128
136
91
105
73
68
64
55
37
42
47
19

GA
168
186
102
142
139
138
136
78
82
82
100
48

GD Pts
−40 132
−50 119
-11 93
−37 89
−66 65
−70 62
−72 52
-23 39
−45 35
−40 30
−53 30
-29 22
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